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ABSTRACT
The Taylor Review asserts that ‘certain groups are also more likely to place a greater
importance on flexibility such as carers, women, those with disabilities and older
workers’. This article draws upon the experiences of workers on non-standard
contracts to explore the notion of worker preference and to expose how the discourse
of work–life balance is usurped to provide justification for flexibility in the interest of
employers rather than workers, reconstructing labour market segregation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Good Work: The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices opens with a statement
of the Review Panel’s ‘single overriding ambition’ that ‘[A]ll work in the UK econ-
omy should be fair and decent with realistic scope for development and fulfilment’
(Taylor, 2017: 7). Bales (2018: 56) notes the borrowing of terminology from, without
effort to align with, the notion of ‘decent work’ advocated by the International La-
bour Organisation. Its Decent Work Agenda is based upon job creation, the promo-
tion of rights at work, social protection and social dialogue with gender equality as
a crosscutting objective (ILO, 2008). With the exception of job creation, these princi-
ples have little interest for the Taylor Review. This evasion is most obviously because
the Taylor Review finds virtue in ‘the British way’ of minimum statutory labour stan-
dards and associated minimal regulation of work relations and employment. Labour
market challenges are acknowledged: a relatively high rate of low pay, incidence of in-
work poverty, stagnant real wage growth and poor productivity performance. Yet
(and now invoking international comparison) emphasis is given to the success of
the UK’s ‘flexible’ labour market in ‘creating jobs, including flexible jobs, which open
up work to people with different needs and priorities and at different stages of life’
(Taylor, 2017: 7). Indeed, the ‘shift towards more flexible forms of working’—or
‘atypical employment’—in recent decades (Taylor, 2017: 23) is cast as supply-side
led. As the labour force has become more diverse, people are looking for work ‘that
suits their individual lifestyle and preferences’ (Taylor, 2017: 26). They choose to
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make ‘trade-offs’ in the ‘rewards of work’—as between pay and hours, job security
and flexibility—in pursuit of their lifestyle preferences. On the principle that ‘society
benefits from allowing individuals to participate in the labour market in a way that
suits them’ (Taylor, 2017: 26), the recommendation is for the law to remain permis-
sive, enabling workers to strike individual bargains with employers rather than being
constrained by prescriptive statutory standards.
This article focuses on the Taylor Review’s claim that
Certain groups are also more likely to place greater importance on flexibility such as carers, women,
those with disabilities and older workers … Flexibility can allow these groups to participate more fully
in the labour market by enabling them to balance work around other priorities. (Taylor, 2017: 15)
The next section, following this introduction, begins to unpack the claim, first by ex-
amining the way preference is constructed. Taylor’s methodology imputes preference 
of lifestyle to individuals on the basis of extant patterning—by gender, age and 
dis/ability—of employment at the macro level. It assumes choice without attending 
to constraints. It usurps, we argue, the discourse of work–life balance (WLB) to pro-
vide justification for employer freedom to use ‘atypical’ contracts to shift the risks and 
costs of employment to workers. Following a discussion of methods, the critique of 
the Taylor Review’s analysis and recommendations is supported by qualitative data 
in the form of worker case studies, gathered over 2016/17 in research for the Low 
Pay Commission (LPC) concerning the impact of non-standard contracts (‘atypical’ 
employment in Taylor Review terms) on the National Living Wage (NLW). The find-
ings explore the construction of preference first through the lens of labour market in-
clusion and second through the lens of WLB, distinguishing between employer-
oriented and worker-oriented temporal flexibilities.
2 LABOUR MARKET INEQUALITY AS LIFESTYLE CHOICE
Taylor encourages a view of quality work less in terms of objective measures than 
through the perspective and preferences of the job seeker or job holder. This is on 
the principle that individuals’ motivations (or what economists would call ‘tastes 
for work’) differ and their ranking of job quality dimensions will be personal or idio-
syncratic (Taylor, 2017: 12). For Taylor (2017: 28) ‘people look for work that suits 
their individual lifestyles and preferences’.
Work preference is a focus of academic debate that has been characterised by con-
troversy. In addressing ‘preference type’ theories of women’s disproportionate repre-
sentation in part-time employment (Hakim, 2002) and explanations in terms of 
structural constraint (Ginn et al., 1996; McRae, 2003), Gash (2008) sets out the chal-
lenges of working preference measurement. These include the inability of current data 
to distinguish between ‘real’ and ‘accommodated’ preferences, the last denoting 
choice in the absence of alternatives (e.g. access to affordable childcare). Gash 
(2008: 658) observes that without accurate measures of preferences before outcome 
and ex post, it is ‘impossible to determine whether preferences determine outcome 
or whether preferences shift to reflect outcome’. She suggests that, given the consider-
able risk of reverse causation in preference formation, preferences should only be used 
as causal explanation of outcome if it is clear that they have not been affected by out-
come (Gash, 2008: 669). Gash concludes that preferences are weak predictors of 
worker outcomes, but that market rigidities and family care responsibilities are likely 
to impede working-preference attainment—contingent on national context, policies 
and practices supportive (or otherwise) of maternal employment.
172) refer to adaptive preferences as among the limitations of reliance upon subjective
measurement (e.g. job satisfaction surveys), that is, unless the aim is to capture
workers’ opinions, values and attitudes towards their jobs rather than the ‘reality and
actual features of jobs’. Job satisfaction surveys are suspected of capturing workers’
preferences formed in relation to expectations, which may explain ‘why some less-
advantaged groups of workers (e.g. women) display higher satisfaction levels than
others enjoying objectively better working conditions’ (Piasna et al., 2017: 171–172).
Piasana et al. favour objective measurement, with workers’ self-report a basis for
auditing the quality of jobs generated. They advocate a multilevel approach
recognising that work and employment are shaped by institutional arrangements and
wider social environment (Piasna et al., 2017: 177–178). Their project aims for a com-
mon methodology, supporting cross-national job quality comparison and evaluation.
Reflection on opportunity and constraints in socially constructed and historically
‘situated’ labour markets prompts consideration of the adequacy of current data for
assessing voluntary and involuntary part-time, or temporary work, or employment
on zero hours contracts (ZHCs) (Cam, 2012). Indeed, it can be argued from a rational
choice perspective that motives for workers to take up temporary employment are
‘essentially non-voluntary’. Given the option of two identical jobs, one with an open-
ended contract and the other with a temporary contract, the rational choice is to take
up the open-ended one, as employment protection places obligations on the employer,
not the employee (Eurofound, 2017: 9). The Eurofound assessment advises caution in
drawing conclusions from Labour Force Survey data, ‘as interview questions on mo-
tives can be open to many interpretations’ (see also Rubery et al., 2016: 238).
Taylor imposes lifestyle preference for ‘flexible work’ on whole population groups—
women, carers, young workers, older workers and the disabled—and as though each
group is internally homogeneous, and none intersect. There is no assiduous investiga-
tion. Chapter 12 includes a sketch of the workforce with ‘atypical’ employment, al-
though the purpose is to fulfil the Review’s terms of reference—‘to look at the
opportunities that new ways of working and technology could offer those currently
under-represented in theUK labourmarket’ (Taylor, 2017: 93)—rather than to substan-
tiate the preference claim. Women—in fact virtually half the UK’s workforce—are the
great majority of the 26 per cent with part-time employment and amajority among each
of workers with ZHCs, temporary jobs and fixed-term contracts. Young workers are
shown to be over-represented among ZHC workers and agency workers. Workers with
disabilities have a high rate of unemployment. Workers in their 50s or 60s are twice as
likely to be self-employed in comparison with younger workers. Black and Minority
Ethnic workers appear for the first time in Taylor’s report at Chapter 12 and are
discussed (together with young workers) as more likely to work in the ‘gig economy’.
The patterns in ‘atypical’ employment identified might prompt questions leading to
analysis of social structure between the individual and labour market position occu-
pied. Taylor does refer to women’s disproportionate representation in part-time em-
ployment and to occupational segregation as contributors to the gender pay gap
and could observe that penalties accumulate over a work–life and into retirement
(the gender pensions gap). However, there is no consideration of how such segrega-
tion shapes identities or provides a context in which choice takes place.
In addressing the issue of labour market segmentation, Grimshaw et al. (2017) re-
ject accounts that focus on the labour supply side and that are modelled within a
framework of individual (or indeed, ‘head of household’) rational choice in response
 
In a similar vein, although with a focus on job quality evaluation, Piasna et al. (2017:
to market signals. Such accounts do not address adequately the power and choices of 
employers or the role of employing organisations, institutions and wider economic 
conditions in shaping labour market inequalities and employment outcomes. These 
include under-investment in productive structures and the undermining of worker or-
ganisation. Labour markets are thus social constructs, and these practices lead to a 
‘continuous regeneration of inequalities through the construction of “non-competing 
groups”, variously based on ‘social class, race, gender, migrant status, age and dis-
ability, among others’ (Grimshaw et al., 2017: 3).
Discrimination in the labour market (with the exception of that on the basis of preg-
nancy and maternity) is another Taylor report evasion. TUC research (2017) shows 
that Black and Minority Ethnic workers are disadvantaged in respect to the quantity 
of work they have access to as well as the quality of jobs. Workers past state pension 
age (rising for women from 2010) account for a substantial proportion of the increase 
in self-employment which, over 2010–14, made a significant contribution to employ-
ment ‘recovery’ from the 2008–9 recession. Yet, a multiplicity of influences have been 
identified, including discrimination in the labour market and pensions too low to sus-
tain subsistence (Chandler and Tetlow, 2014; Cory, 2012). These need to be weighed 
against Taylor’s emphasis on older workers’ quest for autonomy through self-
employment. Taylor emphasises student involvement in ZHC employment, conferring 
on them the motivation of earning to finance, for example, a night out, with no men-
tion of student loans and debt that have constructed students as a labour market.
The Grimshaw et al. framework is informed by feminist analysis of the way that the 
division of the costs of social reproduction fundamentally shapes women’s participa-
tion within the labour market. As noted, there has been heated debate about women’s 
labour market participation, pitching preference and constraint, agency and struc-
ture. Theories of choice guard against substituting structures for human agency, al-
though can present ‘one-sidedly voluntaristic’ accounts (Crompton and Harris, 
1998: 131). Yet it is possible, as Hughes (2002: 105) suggests, ‘to avoid the ‘choice’ 
of either structural or agentic accounts by holding both agency and structure in simul-
taneous relation’. Preferences may shape choices but do not determine them. Women 
‘actively construct their work-life biographies in terms of their historically available 
opportunities and constraints’ (Crompton and Harris, 1998: 448). Thus, the fact that 
part-time work—or in degenerative form, zero hours contracting—is ‘chosen’ by 
some workers as means of achieving WLB does not imply women’s preferences for 
part-time jobs (ZHCs) but, rather, the absence of alternatives, given family responsi-
bilities (Burchell et al., 1997; Gash, 2008).
Research interrogating hypothesised motives for and worker outcomes of non-
standard employment has tended to favour demand-side rather than labour supply-
side accounts. Hosking and Western’s (2008) study of non-standard employment in 
Australia concluded that employers’ demand for workplace flexibility was the driving 
influence and that work–family tensions for parents were exacerbated by flexibility re-
gimes. The Lyness et al. (2012) cross-national study found that control over hours and 
job schedules were a key antecedent of job dissatisfaction and ‘strain-based work-
family conflict’, with women having less control over job schedules. With regard to 
disabled workers and their ‘fit’ with non-standard work, Schur’s (2002) research in 
the United States indicated that while such jobs could assist transition to standard 
work, they provided lower pay and fewer benefits. Non-standard workers with dis-
abilities were more likely to desire full-time work. The Hoque et al. (2014) UK study 
showed that employer willingness to make adjustments (required under legislation) or
to provide worker-oriented flexibility appeared to be limited. Harwood’s (2016) re-
search, also for the UK, suggests that demands on workers to be more adaptable
(e.g. to work more varied and unpredictable hours) inhibited workplace adjustments;
disabled workers were perceived by employers to be relatively more costly, and
workers were fearful of the possible consequences (being sack\ed and facing benefits
sanctions) of pressing for their rights. Taylor emphasises the publicly funded support-
to-work services available for disabled workers, a view at odds with those of disability
activists who have highlighted austerity welfare cuts (Bates et al., 2017). Jones (2017),
responding to the Taylor Review, argued on behalf of older workers that while self-
employment could work well for those with marketable professional expertise, for
others, it is low paid and low grade and can drive the individual or household into in-
creased debt. It is ‘a last resort, not a positive choice’.
3 FLEXIBILITY AS WORK–LIFE BALANCE DISCOURSE
Flexible work constitutes the primary narrative of the Taylor Review; flexibility al-
lows workers to balance work with other commitments such as caring. Crompton
(2002: 546) argued ‘the more negative aspects of neo-liberal numerical flexibility
[were] being glossed as a positive contribution to the reconciliation of employment
and family life’. She identified as among the aims of neo-liberal flexibility capacity
for the employer to push employment costs onto the individual and families. Similarly
Taylor’s narrative resonates with Fleetwood’s (2007) critique of flexibility as con-
structed discursively to underpin the interests of employers rather than workers.
Fleetwood distinguishes WLB and flexibility as a set of practices and as a set of dis-
courses. He argues that flexibility as discourse became hegemonic in the 1990s when
it became associated with family-friendly policies that benefitted employees. From
the late 1990s, however, the discourse started to become detached from practices,
which were now largely employee unfriendly and which constrained WLB. The dis-
course now served to legitimate practices such as unsocial hours working, overtime,
ZHCs, involuntary part-time or temporary working as pro-employee flexibility.
Recalling Crompton, Fleetwood (2007: 396) proposed:
… the discourses of WLB conceal, while promoting, the now ‘rehabilitated’ discourses of flexibility.
Employee-unfriendly flexible working practices remain but are veiled by the mask of WLB discourses
with their employee-friendly connotations.
Rubery et al. (2016) reinforce critique of the construction of flexibility as adaptation
to an increasingly diverse labour force through provision of opportunities for WLB.
They agree that for policy makers flexibility is about reducing costs and freeing em-
ployers to deploy labour according to demand. The apparent use of flexibility to facil-
itate inclusion of workers seeking non-standard hours is not balanced by employer
willingness to reorganise work to facilitate worker commitments outside work
(Rubery et al., 2016: 236). In terms of preference, the involuntary character of em-
ployment may be recast by a worker as the best available option.
Taylor’s brief included attention to groups under-represented in the UK labour
market. A decade on from Fleetwood after crisis and austerity, welfare and benefits
reform, further deregulation of employment rights and curbs on trade unions, Rubery
et al. (2016) elaborate on Fleetwood’s (2007) schema. They add a y-axis of labour
costs (pay, conditions, social security and pensions) to an x-axis of temporal flexibil-
ity, to locate low-paid ‘non-standard’ contractual forms within the vector of
employer-oriented temporal flexibility. As if anticipating Taylor and his subsequent 
evasion, Rubery et al. expose six supposed policy benefits of flexible labour markets, 
two of which are pertinent to this article.
First is the argument that flexible labour markets can promote inclusion of ‘out-
siders’ whose role hitherto has been to shelter a core workforce in standard employ-
ment relationships, underpinning a dualised labour market. Rubery et al. (2016) 
point out the flaws in the logic. In a context in which regulatory change affects all 
workers, ‘outsider’ groups (women, ethnic minorities, older and younger workers 
and the disabled) do not end up competing with the ‘core workforce’; rather, existing 
divisions in the labour market are reinforced. Second is the proposition that flexible 
work promotes diversity and labour market inclusion, to assist government objectives 
for reduced welfare expenditure, by allowing workers to combine work with education 
and caring, accommodating disabled workers’ capacity to work and enabling older 
workers to remain in the labour market following the rise in the state pension age. 
Rubery et al. argue again that such policy logic perpetuates extant gender relations 
and the lower pay inherent to part-time work. Job characteristics are treated as fixed.
Lewis et al. (2007) address the assumption of individual choice and personal re-
sponsibility implicit in the WLB discourse. They argue that choices are always so-
cially embedded, that the assumption of choice neglects gendered contexts and also 
the changing nature of work and that employer practices constrain choice. The dis-
course of choice masks ‘persisting organisational and societal control and constraints’ 
and is often used as ‘a rhetorical device to encourage the acceptance of procedures 
that are in practice double-edged’ (Lewis et al., 2007: 366–367). Important is 
Fleetwood’s suggestion that workers may accept the ‘apparent fairness and symme-
try’ of flexibility and then ‘find themselves trapped, not by a legal, but by a quasi-
moral, obligation’ (Fleetwood, 2007: 397). They may feel that having being granted 
some form of flexibility that may fit with their lives, they are then obliged to recipro-
cate. Fleetwood relates this more directly to new Labour legal Right to Request flex-
ible working (for full-time employees with 26 weeks of continuous service with the 
same employer). Yet this sense of obligation permeates testimonies presented below. 
As outlined, a narrative approach was chosen in order to explore the nuances of hu-
man motivations and preference, recognising that these can shift within a complex 
terrain between individualised and subjective needs and social and collective under-
standings (Ross and Moore, 2014). We draw on research for the Low Pay Commis-
sion (Moore et al., 2017) to interrogate preference and the orientation of temporal 
flexibility in respect to Taylor’s ‘work–life style’ groups in the light of this quasi-moral 
culture but also work design and contractual forms that facilitate employer appropri-
ation of unpaid labour time.
4 RESEARCH METHODS
The research for the LPC addressed the relationship of non-standard contracts to the 
NLW. Its qualitative approach involved 36 worker case studies drawn from six low-
paying industry sectors known to use non-standard contracts in the forms of ZHCs, 
minimum hours contracts (MHCs), agency work and/or dependent self-employment. 
Descriptive and evaluative in type (Merriam, 1998), the case studies were based on 
face-to-face interviews with two workers from one organisation in each of the six sec-
tors in three regions. They formed a purposive sample, but having six in each sector 
across three regions enhanced the representativeness of sectors and allowed local
labour market contextualisation. The regions capture concentrations of dependent
self-employment (London), ZHCs (the South West) and areas of low pay where there
were disproportionate gains from the introduction of the NLW (South Yorkshire)
(Citizens Advice, 2015; Resolution Foundation, 2016).
Given word-length restrictions, this article focuses on case studies in three of the
six sectors: homecare, retail and logistics (see Table 1). Homecare has a high propor-
tion of workers on ZHCs (56 per cent of care workers according to Skills for Care,
2017). Women predominate in the care workforce that has included a high propor-
tion of workers born overseas. Online shopping has increased demand for home de-
livery services, and the logistics sector has seen a proliferation of owner drivers
working for large delivery companies alongside directly employed drivers but paid
by delivery (Moore and Newsome, 2018). Four of six individual case studies are par-
cel delivery drivers attached to large national or international logistics companies.
Wholesale and retail have 8 per cent of those employed on ZHCs, but retail is partic-
ularly dependent upon MHCs (USDAW, 2014). All six worker case studies in retail
were employed by large national chains. Over half of retail jobs are held by workers
aged 34 or younger (Office for National Statistics, 2015). A substantial proportion
will be students; nearly one quarter (877,000) of the 3.91 million 16–24-year-olds
working in the UK are full-time students in part-time jobs (Office for National
Statistics, 2017).
The sensitivities of the issues addressed and fact that low-paid workers with non-
standard contracts may have few organisational or institutional ties made research ac-
cess challenging. Approaches through employers and trade unions assisted. A
snowballing approach was used; in all cases once one worker was identified, they were
asked if they had a colleague who might be prepared to be interviewed. The analysis
draws on interviews with managers in retail, which helped to contextualise the sched-
uling of work, and three interviews with trade union officers, providing a wider con-
text on contractual status. Few workers had fixed workplaces where they felt
comfortable being interviewed, so interviews were conducted in public places (e.g.
for homecare workers in the cafes where they based themselves between client visits).
In retail, all but one worker in the sample was under 30. The age profile was more
varied in the other two sectors (see Table 2). Table 3 shows that the sample is diverse
in terms of gender and race and ethnicity, broadly reflecting the overall make-up of
the sectors. The organisations represented are small and medium sized as well as
large. Three of the 18 workers in the sample had degrees, and two were full-time stu-
dents. Two workers were recent migrants from Eastern Europe.
Methodologies adhered to the Social Research Association Ethical Guidelines
based on voluntary participation and informed consent. Organisations and
Table 1: The sample of workers by contract and region
Sector London South West Yorkshire & Humberside Total
Retail 2 (MHC) 2 (MHC) 2 (ZHC) 6
Social Care 2 (ZHC) 2 (ZHC) 2 (ZHC) 6
Logistics 2 (DS-E) 2 (DS-E) 2 (ZHC) 6
Total Worker Case Studies 6 6 6 18
Table 3: The sample of workers by sector, gender and ethnicity









Retail 2 4 2 3 1 6
Social care 1 5 1 5 6
Logistics 5 1 5 1 6
Total worker
case studies
8 (44%) 10 (56%) 2 (11%) 1 (6%) 13 (72%) 2 (11%) 18
Sector Age Total
Under 25 25–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60 plus
Retail 2 3 1 6
Social care 2 3 1 6
Logistics 1 1 2 2 6
Total worker
case studies
2 (11%) 3 (17%) 2 (11%) 3 (17%) 5 (28%) 3 (17%) 18
Table 2: The sample of workers by sector and age
individuals have been anonymised and participants given pseudonyms. Gift cards 
were offered to acknowledge the time workers gave to the research in interviews. 
These took place between October 2016 and July 2017, lasted an hour on average, 
were recorded and fully transcribed. The case studies were written up in a 
standardised format around key emergent themes eliciting common or contrasting ex-
periences, perceptions and interpretations, with each located in an organisational 
context.
Interviews gathered work histories and allowed exploration of factors that drive 
‘flexible work’ and extent to which these result from preference or are involuntary. 
Examined in the case studies are the impact of variable contractual arrangements, 
with work located within the wider household context, illuminating how working 
hours fit with caring responsibilities and the interaction with in-work benefits. An 
approach based upon work histories highlights contradictions and tensions between 
hegemonic, subordinate and counter-hegemonic discourses which, as highlighted in 
the following sections, workers could move between in the course of an interview. 
Testimonies convey consent and dissent and may focus on individual choice or per-
ceived failure rather than wider structural issues and inequalities (Ecclestone, 
2004). There is variation in the extent of politicised and social understandings, 
yet these are evident in testimonies. This narrative approach, being resource-
intensive, is based on a small number of worker participants. The intent is to en-
capsulate rich detail in specific contexts, rather than to generalise from individual 
case studies.
The Taylor Review suggests that work can vary in quality according to worker moti-
vations for seeking it, that motivations are defined by the characteristics of groups in
the labour market and that flexible working can accommodate diversity in terms of
capacity and availability for work. One group with constrained availability are those
in higher education. For Taylor, student motivation for working might be to earn
money for ‘extras’ such as concert tickets (Taylor, 2017: 12). This would suggest that
students work limited hours.
Orla was in higher education and worked 36 hours a week (four or five shifts of
seven to nine hours) as a shift manager in fast food retail. She appreciated the flexibil-
ity of a ZHC or, more precisely, the employer’s willingness to schedule shifts around
her university attendance. She said that ‘as long as they’ve got the labour to spend on
you, they’ll give you the shifts that fit your availability’ (Orla,YorksRetail2). Lisa,
aged 24 and not a student, had a ZHC with the same retailer as Orla. She worked
eight-hour night shifts, five days a week. She reflected on the perceived flexibility of
ZHCs for particular labour market groups:
A lot of people who work in the fast food industry are young students, migrants who, I think just see it
as normal, especially young people-it’ll be one of their first jobs and in this current climate with zero
hours, they’ll take it as normal and they’ll be used to it. I don’t think it’s right to say that no one likes
working on a zero hours contract; I think there’s definitely, people that it works really well for, but I
think those people are a minority. But I think also, a lot of people are just used to it and don’t know
anything different. (Lisa,YorksRetail1)
Case study workers in supermarkets had MHCs with core or guaranteed hours but
were expected to state their wider availability and to ‘flex-up’ as required. Preference
could be constrained. Romesh, a full-time student employed by a national retailer,
was contracted to work three night shifts a week and regularly worked an extra
two. He wanted to work fewer nights to limit the impact on his academic work,
but was reluctant to turn down shifts as he felt his job was not ‘fully secure’ (he had
not as yet received a formal contract). Living with his mother—who had three jobs
—and his two siblings, Romesh felt he had to contribute to the household income.
Work was a necessity for Romesh, chiming with wider findings on the importance
of financial motivations for student labour market participation including avoiding
student debt (Evans et al., 2012). Romesh’s need to work placed him in a dependent
relationship in which the employer benefitted from his need for flexibility. A store
manager described how having staff on flexible contracts ‘works well for the com-
pany’. Holiday entitlement could be based on contractual rather than actual hours.
Staff hours could be ‘flexed-down’ to the contractual—a manipulation that could
be ‘frustrating’ for individuals:
An employee could work, one week they could work 36 hours, the next week they could work 14 and
then up to 21, depending on the need of the week. (Manager,LondonRetail)
Taylor proposes that flexible working is advantageous for older workers wishing to
remain in the labour market. Three workers in the sample were over 60 and had taken
their pensions. Janice worked on a self-employed basis as a ‘home courier’ for a mul-
tinational parcel delivery company that advertised the work as flexible with choice
over the number of days worked and the timing of working hours. She had thought
she would be ‘very much in control of my business’. In practice, she had found ‘you
don’t have the freedom of your day’. She currently worked seven days a week on
5 PREFERENCE, DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION?
two contracts. There was much preparatory work, but she was paid by actual delivery
or collection (not for non-delivery). Janice felt ‘like it’s taken over our lives and the
stress and anxiety and the fatigue that it causes is huge and I just feel that we’re miss-
ing life’ (Janice,SWLogistics1). She had wanted ‘a little part-time job’ to supplement
her state pension and thought she would struggle financially without it, raising issues
about flexible work subsidising poor pension provision, particularly for women.
Jim, a retired police officer who had taken his pension, and Tom, one of three
workers in the sample who had second jobs, worked on ZHCs for a leading European
vehicle rental company delivering hire cars. They could be sent home if there were no
deliveries to make. Jim was not dependent on the income: it gave him ‘a bit of pocket
money’. Tom’s full-time public sector job was, he described, low paid, and he had
young children to support. He needed additional income and worked 14 to 15 hours
on car delivery although emphasised how
… it’s up and down all the time, it’s as and when required, you can be half way through a shift and they
can say we don’t need you anymore, and you’ve no rights really …. (Tom,YorksLogistics1)
Terri worked in homecare and also cleaning. She would have preferred to work full-
time in homecare but could not afford to: she earned £8 an hour compared with £10
for cleaning. She said she did not agree with use of ZHCs, but that ‘at the moment
strangely enough it suits me in that I can fit the cleaning work in’ (Terri,
YorksHomecare1).
The case studies suggest that a preference for flexible work can be a matter of finan-
cial exigency. The associated low pay (generally the NMW for under 25s, at or near
the NLW for those over 25) may be subsidised by other forms of income—from pen-
sions, another job, student finance or state benefits—which in turn are not enough to
live on. Workers wholly dependent on such work for survival may feel obliged to tol-
erate long or unpredictable hours. Jim referred to ‘other lads’at the car rental ‘who are
sort of full time if you like, they’re there until eight, nine o’clock at night sometimes,
from half seven in the morning’ and paid the basic minimum wage throughout. He
commented that ‘they are sort of, not held to ransom, but they feel that if they don’t
put the hours in they won’t get the money that they want’ (Jim,YorksSecurity2).
Characterisation of flexible work as reflecting the preference of certain groups in the
labour market stigmatises these groups and, in the literature, has cast them as labour
market ‘outsiders’ (Rubery et al., 2016). While such jobs may be seen to accommodate
availability or capacity at certain points in the life cycle, the case studies suggest that
they offer few routes to insider status. Episodic working time is not conducive to train-
ing or workplace learning. Roshane, working for a national supermarket, said ‘I didn’t
knowmuch and I couldn’t learn, I couldn’t train when you are doing five hours a week’
(LondonRetail2). The research found evidence of the compression of grading and dif-
ferentials and of workers having little incentive to take on supervisory or managerial
positions. The delayering of supervisory and managerial grades increased the work
of all staff. Romesh’s experience in retail had not encouraged him to pursue promotion:
I’ve got people in my retail saying become a manager. But I’ve seen them, how it was and they’re
stressed as well. By observing them, I can see how hard the job is. They don’t have time for family or
anything. (Romesh,LondonRetail1)
The suggestion that the demographics of the labour market define choice and job 
characteristics reinforces divisions of labour and insider/outside status and degrades
the flexible jobs that these groups and others depend upon. Particular groups of
workers are required to adjust to jobs, rather than organisations adjusting jobs to
the reality of worker lives (Rubery et al., 2016). This reflects Fleetwood’s (2007) argu-
ments on the narrative of WLB.
6 WORK–LIFE BALANCE—WHOSE FLEXIBILITY?
Taylor argues that flexible working patterns enable workers ‘to balance other commit-
ments in their life, such as around family or other caring responsibilities’. He proposes
that ‘[I]n conjunction with active labour market policies around welfare to work, this
has led to very positive increases in employment for groups such as lone parents’
(Taylor, 2017: 93). Alexis, a lone parent working for a national retailer, coordinated
her shifts with her mother’s so that they could share care for her two-year-old daugh-
ter. Alexis wanted to work additional hours for financial reasons but been told that
the store did not have the funding. She struggled on her income and also worried that
there were limits to what she could earn without putting her benefits at risk.
I’ve been told I can’t do more than 16 hours, not if I want to keep my benefits rolling with my house
which I need to because it’s a private property. I can’t afford to mess it up, I really can’t afford to.
(Alexis,SWRetail2)
Homecare worker Terri’s partner was on disability living allowance and she had to be
mindful of her working hours and the issues raised when these fluctuated:
I’m only supposed to work 16 hours otherwise his benefits are affected, so that’s like 64 hours a month,
but this month I’ve done 80 hours because they’re short staffed and he’s done his nut. (Terri,
YorksHomecare1)
They relied on his benefits for ‘a little bit of help’ with rent and council tax.
For Taylor, flexibility underpinsWLB, and there may be a trade-off between aspects
of quality work like pay and the need to balance work around other priorities.Workers
in this study, however, emphasised that unpredictability of work schedules precludes
such balance. In homecare, ZHCs accommodate fluctuations in the care commissioned
by local authorities within constrained budgets. Homecare workers were paid for time
in clients’ houses: when clients were hospitalised, or died, or did not want to receive a
visit, workers lost hours and pay. Despite this, in the South West, Mary and Linda
reported that they were required to demonstrate unlimited availability:
We’re actually being told now that this is a job that’s 24/7. If you don’t particularly want to do those
hours you shouldn’t have come to the company.
Being available does not guarantee hours but can be experienced as being ‘on call’.
Mary explained that insecurity in respect to hours and pay was a function of
the work:
It goes through fits and fancies. You could be doing 15 or 30 hours for quite a while and then suddenly -
obviously in this job people go into respite, people pass away - so you can lose hours quite quickly. And
then it could take quite a long time to build those hours back up or it could happen very quickly again, it
just depends. There’s never a structure, there’s no rhyme or reason. They can take people away from us
at any time because they are not our permanent jobs—we are told ‘no job is your own.’ (Mary,
SWHomecare1)
Mary’s weekly hours and hence pay had fallen over the previous year as client num-
bers had contracted. She had been obliged to work a weekly ‘waking sleep-in’ (nine
hours) in order to make up earnings. In homecare in Yorkshire, Bob’s schedules were
sent to his mobile at three days’ notice, so ‘you cannot plan a life at all’. In London,
Margaret recalled a period in the previous year where three clients were in hospital
and she lost nearly four hours pay per day.
Minimum hours contracts imply more formalised availability to the employer than
ZHCs. In retail contractual hours were low; some respondents wanted more yet were
obliged to take on extra hours at short notice. Lisa in the fast food sector referred to
the ‘instability’ of shifts, which could be scheduled three days in advance. Kevin
worked in security but also for a national homeware chain.1 Rotas were fixed a week
in advance, but shift patterns could be chaotic so that work made incursions into
social life. Kevin recounted being phoned on his mobile on his day off when he was
in a pub about to enjoy a night out and asked why he was not at work:
I’m just like “no it says on my rota it’s my day off because I’ve not been given a new rota” … In the end,
I had the right to say no, but I still went in to work anyway—it’s still money at the end of the day.
(Kevin,YorksRetail/Security2)
Kevin’s decision may suggest Fleetwood’s (2007)‘moral obligation’ as well as finan-
cial motivation.
So-called self-employment did not necessarily give workers control over their work. 
The company’s surveillance of delivery work (tasks and their completion) meant for 
Janice ‘I don’t feel like I’m self-employed’. John, a ‘home courier’ with the same com-
pany, explained that his six-day week was not his choice but rather ‘it’s the contract’. 
Bicycle couriers discussed the intensity of work promoted by payment by results or 
piece work. Olsi cycled 45 hours a week, 80 miles per day and, paid per delivery, took 
few breaks.
It’s mostly like cycling, eating and sleeping and cycling, eating, sleeping. (Olsi,LondonLogistics1)
He would like to have worked less but needed to put in those hours of cycling to make 
ends meet.
The concept of WLB implies a recognition of unsocial hours and excessive overtime 
and that both should attract compensation. However, the research suggested that some 
employers had moved to reduce or remove unsocial hours’ premia, possibly in response 
to the introduction of the NLW. For Roshane in retail, the night shift allowance had 
been halved to £1 per hour. A manager in another of the company’s stores confirmed 
that premia for evening work had been removed in November 2016 and now applied 
only from midnight to 6.00 a.m. In fact, the night team had been disbanded and 
long-service workers who could not get full-time day shifts to replace their hours and 
pay had left. The manager reported that full-time standard contracts were being 
displaced by flexi hours. In homecare in the South West, Mary described how the orga-
nisation’s proposal at the end of 2015 to eliminate the weekend premium rate had met 
with opposition: ‘the girls refused to work’. The employer’s subsequent offer of £10 an 
hour was accepted, despite the worker’s appeal ‘against all these cuts’.
Related to WLB are the issues of holiday and sick pay. Workers on ZHCs and 
MHCs have rights to paid holidays, but some in the sample had been told the hourly 
rate already contained an element of ‘holiday’ pay. While there are rights to Statutory
1 Kevin was included in the wider LPC sample because he worked in security, but his second job in retail 
meant he straddled our categories.
Sick Pay after four continuous days of sickness, this may not reflect working patterns.
ZHC workers have no right to occupational sick pay because there is no obligation to
work and therefore can be no absence from work on account of sickness. A number of
workers were unclear about holiday and sickness entitlement and there was some re-
luctance to go sick because of the loss of pay, but also employer responses, which
might affect the future allocation of hours. In homecare, workers were aware of the
implications for the quality of care of going into vulnerable people’s homes when sick
themselves, but countervailing pressures—both financial and their commitment to cli-
ents—often prevailed.
Dependent self-employed workers have no entitlement to sick or holiday pay and
are often required to find substitutes if they take holiday or sick days. Janice had
not had a holiday in the time she had been in courier work; she would lose income
and confront the difficulty of recruiting someone sufficiently familiar with the work
and the round to cover in her absence (the company was exploring the option of
allocating a substitute for every round).
The Taylor Review concedes that a culture of unpaid overtime has developed. Yet
this is a function of ZHCs and ‘self-employment’ where there are no set hours on
which overtime can be based or calculated. Lisa referred to ‘forced overtime’ in fast
food retail; people were asked to stay on after their shift, which could be in breach
of working time rest-period regulations.
If they ask us to stay on or say we can’t leave, obviously they can’t legally, but then we all know that we
could just get our shifts taken off us. (Lisa,YorksRetail1)
7 EMPLOYER-ORIENTED FLEXIBILITY, WORKERS’ ADDITIONAL AND
UNPAID LABOUR
Flexible contractual arrangements facilitate unpaid labour. In homecare pay can be
on the basis of client contact time alone with travel time between clients, supervision,
training and staff meetings unpaid (Hayes and Moore, 2016). Care workers may dip
below the NLW when time and pay are averaged out. In London, Carol was not paid
for travel time between visits; ‘I know it’s not good, but what can you do?’ In York-
shire, Bob’s organisation added a sum of money for travel, but this did not reflect his
actual travel time, which could be 10 hours per week. In the South West, Mary was
paid for travel time but at £6.70 an hour—lower than the NLW. A lack of transpar-
ency had been raised by her trade union on the basis that a new electronic ‘web roster’
system had been introduced with no itemisation of paid time on the pay slip.
Another aspect of homecare can be the episodic nature of work, the so-called
down-time or waiting time during the day where workers may not be able to go home
and are effectively available to the employer. Mary reported that care workers used to
be paid to go back home and come out again if there was a ‘break’ between clients
above an hour, but with the change in company ownership, the ‘rules’ were unclear.
Linda recalled that on the most recent Sunday worked she had visited seven clients,
the first at 8.00 hours and the last between 20.50 and 21.20. Her client contact time
over the day was 4.5 hours. There was ‘a gap’ from 12.30 to 16.00 hours which Linda
liked—while recognising some colleagues preferred to work the day without a break.
Yet she qualified that
I can’t go home and relax because I’ve got my working head on so I’m ready to go back out. I’ll go
home and cook the meal but I don’t change out of my uniform. (Linda,SWHomecare2)
Workers described a variety of ways whereby elements of unpaid labour were intro-
duced into their work and ZHCs, in inducing availability and episodic work, facilitate
this. Self-employment where pay is based on output (e.g. actual parcel delivery) nec-
essarily means that workers’ ‘non-productive’ time is unpaid.
Availability to the organisation on an unpaid or paid basis reflects the predomi-
nance of employer-oriented flexibility over worker-oriented flexibility and the asym-
metry of power between employers and workers that Taylor’s notion of preference
downplays. The perception of availability to employers could be experienced as subtle
expectation for reciprocity. Roshane described how expectations of availability are
transmitted apparently informally by line managers:
You know when someone tries to ask you something and keeps on asking and asking and asking? It’s
almost like they want you to do it, so they force you to do it. (Roshane,LondonRetail2)
Other workers had a clearer critique of the way non-standard contracts shape the em-
ployment relationship. For Bob, who worked for a homecare provider on a ZHC,
12 days on with two days off, the issue was less about hours than the imbalance in
the employment relationship and resulting insecurity:
Zero hours gives them more power, that’s what he [the employer] thinks anyway, because it’s like hire
and fire and he can just give me zero hours one week and he can just change things very quickly using
those contracts. (Bob, YorksHomecare2)
Bob understood the business case for ZHCs and critiqued the short-term horizons. 
Should the employer have ambition ‘to build a longer-term business and better 
quality staff, more committed staff, he should have proper contracts’. Alan, a self-
employed courier, belonged to a trade union that had been negotiating around 
employment status and stated ‘the argument is that self-employment isn’t without 
employment rights—it’s not mutually exclusive’. What he decried was treatment of 
the self-employed as ‘second-class citizens’. Instead of thanks for the work contrib-
uted over the year, ‘you don’t even get invited to any sort of Christmas parties’. 
You are ‘not part of the company until it suits them’ (Alan,LondonLogistics1).
8 CONCLUSIONS
The workers’ testimonies expose Taylor’s rhetoric that non-standard contracts assist 
reconciliation of paid work with other commitments and desires. WLB is employer-
oriented temporal and financial flexibility that, through unpredictable scheduling 
and demands for availability to the employer, generates conflict between work and 
other priorities. Workers highlight the capacity of ZHCs and MHCs to induce their 
availability to employers and to facilitate episodic working sometimes linked by pe-
riods of unpaid labour. Historically, standard contracts have offered protection from 
employer abuse of the employment relationship (Fudge, 2017). Many workers in the 
sample understood that their contractual situation increased their dependence upon 
employers and managers. Whatever choice over work they might have in theory, 
the balance of power in the workplace was not in their favour. Their dependence upon 
employers to allocate hours made them vulnerable and diminished their control over 
working lives with concrete implications for WLB.
Evidence of beneficial flexibility is limited. Even where workers conceded that con-
tracts fitted around study, retirement or caring responsibilities, in only three cases did 
hours provide the regularity and predictability that workers desired. Overall ZHCs
and MHCs meant uncertainty and insecurity, particularly for those wholly dependent
upon them. The worker case studies confirm Taylor’s ‘culture of unpaid overtime’
and retreat from acknowledgement of unsocial hours through premia. Generally,
these contracts were not progressive for work–life balance, and if there was a
‘trade-off’, it provided little reward. Preferences were constrained by the welfare sys-
tem, caring commitments, inadequacy of pensions and pay in primary jobs and the
cost of full-time higher education. All placed limitations or pressures on working
hours. Many workers in the sample could not live independently of families or other
adults (in multi-unit households) or realistically aspire to home ownership.
Depictions of job quality as individual taste are not borne out. Structural con-
straints on preference persist and are not independent of institutions and markets or
socialisation (Gash, 2008). They underpin and reproduce labour market segregation
based upon gender, race and ethnicity, age and disability. This is not to say that
agency is unimportant; the testimonies articulate preferences and in some cases satis-
faction. Some simultaneously convey consent and dissent, and others are apparently
contradictory in wanting both flexibility and full employment rights within their cur-
rent contractual relationship. There are traces of Fleetwood’s quasi-moral, obligation
to provide what is seen as reciprocal flexibility, and such reciprocity is embedded in
the reality of ZHCs and to a lesser extent MHCs. Younger workers in particular sug-
gested that these contracts have been normalised; as Roshane put it, ‘It should not be
normal, but it is normal’.
A significant finding was the reluctance of workers to progress their careers, per-
ceiving that reward for supervisory or managerial responsibilities was not worthwhile
financially nor in terms of WLB. The limitations on training and learning that appear
to be inherent in low-paid non-standard work have wider implications for labour
market inclusion and workforce skills. The depressing implication of Taylor’s state-
ment cited at the beginning of this article is his suggestion that the demographics
of the labour market define choice and job characteristics and that this relationship
is fixed. In contradiction, non-standard contracts entrench divisions of labour on
the basis of gender, ethnicity, age and disability and encourage stigma in the labour
market. They signify a retreat from organisational responsibility to provide jobs that
facilitate WLB or reasonable adjustment, as well as any ‘business case for diversity’.
Those with responsibilities generated by extant relations of social reproduction will
face constraints in labour market participation in the absence of national policies
or employer practices that support parental employment or provide workplace
adjustments.
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